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ABSTRACT
European institutionalisation of public health policy has never been more 
topical than in the COVID-19 era. One European agency has come to the fore: 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Historically, 
the ECDC’s mandate has expanded only gradually and the management of 
transboundary health crises has remained ultimately in the hands of Member 
States. The unprecedented severity of COVID-19 has led the European 
Commission to propose an extension of the ECDC’s mandate. This study 
assesses the expansion of the formal and informal mandates of the ECDC over 
15 years to contextualise the catalytic impact of COVID-19. It is found that 
while institutional change occurs in the aftermath of a transboundary health 
crisis, it builds on a long-term process of gradual institutionalisation that is 
accelerated by the crisis acting as a catalyst but not fully determined by it.
KEYWORDS COVID-19; SARS; health; European integration; crisis; institutional change
The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the hurdles faced by the European 
Union (EU) in supporting the coordination of Member States’ responses 
to a transboundary health crisis. The EU’s initial response to COVID-19 
has been criticised for delays in responding to the pandemic (Clemens and 
Brand 2020; Pacces and Weimer 2020; Renda and Castro 2020) and more 
recently for the slow vaccination rollout. Nevertheless, health threat man-
agement at the EU level is limited to coordinating national responses rather 
than managing risks – i.e. commanding responses (Article 168 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU). Coordination is facilitated by the existence 
of the Health Security Committee (HSC), the Council formation convening 
health ministries’ representatives (Greer 2012). However, it ultimately 
remains in the hands of Member States whether to adopt measures related 
to treatments (vaccination) or containment (Non-Pharmaceutical 
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Interventions, NPI). As such, collective action has been rather difficult, 
except in crisis situations, which, historically, have fostered institutionali-
sation (Boin et al. 2013; Greer 2012; Lamping and Steffen 2009).
The role of crises in the institutionalisation of health threats manage-
ment is best exemplified by the creation of the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the European agency in charge 
of monitoring health threats, created in 2004 in the aftermath of the 
2002 SARS outbreak (Deruelle 2016; Greer 2012). While the creation of 
such a European agency does not take away Member States’ prerogatives, 
it nevertheless furthers institutionalisation (Kelemen 2002; Lamping and 
Steffen 2009; Migliorati 2020; Thatcher 2011). That said, the SARS crisis 
did not radically transform the state of play in EU health crisis man-
agement. The creation of EU agencies following crises is often an insti-
tutional compromise (Busuioc 2012, 2016; Busuioc and Groenleer 2013, 
Migliorati 2020; Thatcher 2011). The creation of the ECDC was not an 
abrupt and radical institutional change, but the outcome of a layering 
process (Thelen 2003): the ECDC was added on top of existing networks 
for infectious diseases surveillance. Five years later, the 2009 H1N1 crisis 
led to an informal institutional change, a conversion process (Thelen 
2003): while no rule was changed, the ECDC was involved in the strategy 
for vaccination, in spite of restrictions imposed by its mandate. And, 
post the H1N1 crisis, the layering of new rules formalised the HSC via 
legislation (European Union 2013). We thus ask: how is the COVID-19 
crisis promoting further institutionalisation of the governance system for 
health threats management in the EU?
This article investigates the catalytic impact of the COVID-19 crisis 
on the EU’s capacity to coordinate risk management and more specifically 
the expansion of the mandate of the ECDC over time. The Centre’s 
mandate is, as per its founding regulation (Regulation No 851/2004), 
restricted to risk assessment – the surveillance of risks to human health 
from communicable diseases – and it specifically excludes risk manage-
ment from its purview (Greer and Mätzke 2012). The coordination of 
vaccination and containment measures such as confinement remain the 
prerogative of the Commission and the HSC. This distinction has been, 
historically, rigidly enforced. The ECDC, by the mere fact it embodies 
the cognitive dimension of disease control has a vantage point over this 
field; and Member States have been reluctant to allow the Centre to 
weigh into the coordination of health threats management.
However, a year after the initial outbreak, the COVID-19 crisis has 
spawned a proposal from the European Commission that includes the ability 
for the ECDC to formulate recommendations on health threats management 
to the HSC and thus be directly involved in the coordination of risk man-
agement. This would be an important change for the ECDC and the 
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governance of health threats in the EU: the Centre’s mandate (Regulation 
No 851/2004) is – so far – restricted to the surveillance of risks to human 
health from communicable diseases. It specifically excludes risk management 
(Greer and Mätzke 2012). Treatments such as vaccination and NPI such as 
confinement have remained the prerogative of national authorities. With 
this recent proposal, the Commission is seising the opportunity to fully take 
advantage of the legal framework at its disposal, and it acknowledges the 
need for policy coordination at EU level through the construction of func-
tional EU capacity to manage transboundary health crises.
However, throughout the COVID-19 crisis, the ECDC has crossed the 
fine line between coordinating risk assessment and coordinating risk man-
agement. Drawing on process-tracing, this article evidences a change in 
practices regarding the role of the ECDC in coordinating risk management, 
amid the COVID-19 crisis. This change unfolded prior to the proposal 
for formal change put forward by the Commission. We therefore contend 
that the Commission’s proposal for formal change sanctions previous grad-
ual changes in practices, and that, in this domain of high-level formal 
constraints, crises play the role of catalysts for different forms of gradual 
institutional innovations rather than provoking major punctuations.
The first section of the article develops our theoretical expectations 
regarding the role of crises as catalysts for change, based on Thelen’s con-
ceptualisation of endogenous institutional change (2003), and articulates 
our methodological approach. The next section discusses institutional inno-
vation pre-COVID-19, from the creation of the ECDC, through the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic and up to the COVID-19 crisis. The following section 
then analyses the catalyst impact of the COVID-19 crisis and evidences a 
change in practices accelerating amid crisis, before formal, legal change is 
proposed by the Commission. The final section concludes on the role of 
the COVID-19 crisis in the institutionalisation of public health in the EU.
Crisis as catalyst for gradual institutional change
Among exogenous factors likely to foster institutional change, crises are 
often considered as a golden opportunity for pushing new solutions on to 
the agenda (Birkland 1998). Yet, given the limited capacity for EU inter-
vention in the field of health, it is unlikely to expect that any health crisis, 
even one as lethal as COVID 19, should produce an abrupt and far-reaching 
shift towards a fully integrated European health policy (Lamping and 
Steffen 2009). The 2013 Ebola crisis, for example, did not lead to any 
large-scale change in cooperation practices between Member States (De 
Raeve 2020). This is because opportunities for radical change are limited 
in the field of European public health (Boin et al. 2013; Greer 2012; 
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Lamping and Steffen 2009), unlike the field of health care, where the role 
of the European Court of Justice has been a central force in fostering a 
health policy via the internal market (Martinsen 2012; Vollaard and 
Martinsen 2017). Because the range of formal opportunities for institu-
tionalisation is severely constrained (Boin et al. 2013; Greer 2012), we 
contend that rather than producing a punctuated discontinuous change in 
the rules, transboundary health crises act as catalysts for gradual institu-
tional changes.
While crisis remains a rather underdefined concept (Hay 1999), we 
follow Boin et al. (2013: 9) in defining EU transboundary crises as situ-
ations ‘when life-sustaining systems or critical infrastructures of multiple 
members states are acutely threatened’. As Boin et al. (2014: 420) put it, 
‘the defining characteristic of a transboundary crisis (…) is its potential 
to jump geographical borders and policy boundaries’. The COVID-19 
crisis has triggered a context of high uncertainty to deal with a threat 
that is ‘hard to chart’ (Boin 2019: 95; Boin et al. 2014): at the time of 
the original outbreak, the far-reaching potential implications of the crisis 
were not fully seized and there was no ‘ready-to-go’ collective manage-
ment response among the EU’s Member States.
Recent years have provided examples of the impact of crises related to 
immigration or the economy on the European agenda (Brack et al. 2019; 
Jones et al. 2016; Niemann and Speyer 2018; Thatcher and Woll 2016). 
Responses to crises, in combination with advocacy, have become an import-
ant factor for institutionalisation (Boin et al. 2014; Groenleer 2009; Migliorati 
2020). For example, the ‘mad cow’ crisis in the 1990s led to the creation 
of the European Food Safety Authority (Boin et al. 2014; Groenleer 2009; 
Kelemen 2002; Renda and Castro 2020). The catalytic potential for institu-
tional change through crisis is nevertheless not set in stone (Voltolini et al. 
2020). As Boin et al. (2014: 419) emphasise, ‘there is no institutional blue-
print’. As such, the question of how and to what extent crises act as catalysts 
for gradual institutional change and innovation remains.
Thelen (2000) emphasises that the institutional response to exogenous 
shocks is often evolutionary. Crises, according to Thelen, are opportunities 
for institutional renegotiation (Thelen 2000). This renegotiation process 
leads to innovation that significantly redesigns the shape and functioning 
of the institutions over time. Crisis may not automatically lead to radical 
change that is directly observable at a specific time. Instead, it may 
change the configuration of actors as well as the distribution of power, 
and lead to gradualism in institutional innovation. If crises widen the 
field of possibilities, additional mechanisms are thus necessary to explain 
specific paths of institutional innovation.
Theories of endogenous institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Thelen 2003) emphasise a number of mechanisms for institutional 
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 5
innovation. Predominant among these mechanisms for gradual institutional 
change are the patterns of layering, displacement, drift and conversion 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005). The mechanisms 
of displacement and layering both address a formal change in the rules. 
Displacement characterises the replacement of rules. For example, the role 
of the ECDC as fire alarm (signalling the depth and the breadth of health 
threats) might be abandoned and taken over by national agencies and/or 
the WHO. Layering (Schickler 2001; Thelen 2003) leads to the introduction 
of new rules that co-exist with instead of replacing previous ones. For 
instance, the ECDC may be tasked with new prerogatives regarding the 
coordination of health threats management via new legislation. As a result 
the Centre would not lose its previous functions, but they would be sig-
nificantly altered. The example of the addition of a private pension pillar 
to an existing public pension system is often used as an illustration of the 
layering process (Thelen 2000). The public pillar is not formally dismantled 
and continues to exist, but gradually becomes one pillar among others. 
As Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 17) emphasise, displacement is similar to 
a paradigmatic shift while layering ‘works within the existing system’: 
instead of formally dismantling institutional rules, new rules are added to 
the existing ones in order to change the way the institution functions.
On the contrary, drift and conversion are processes that trigger a 
change in the practices rather than in the formal rules. Drift (Hacker 
2005) takes place if the rules in force are abandoned in practice. In the 
case of the ECDC, this may, for example, result in discontinuing infor-
mation collection and transmission. Conversion also maintains the existing 
rules but a change in the practices leads to a new interpretation or 
different application of the rules (Thelen 2003). Weir shows for example 
how the American poverty program was increasingly channelled into 
support for the Black community (Weir 1992 in Thelen 2000). The bulk 
of the program itself remained as it originally stood but its application 
changed. Conversion would thus lead to a strengthening in practices, 
with the ECDC gradually expanding its role from risk assessment to the 
coordination of risk management.
We advance two theoretical expectations about the impact of crisis 
on institutional innovation in highly constrained domains. First, crises 
are unlikely to result in rapid and radical institutional change in these 
domains. Crises can play a catalytic role in accelerating change but do 
not determine the outcome. Our second expectation emphasises that 
crises articulate informal (practice level) and formal (rule level) institu-
tional change, rather than promote a specific mechanism of institutional 
innovation. Formal opportunities are limited, there is neither the space 
nor the time for negotiating a change in the rules during a crisis, but 
this does not prevent formal change after the crisis. Following Boin et al. 
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2013, we make a distinction between institutional change during the 
crisis and after the crisis. For example, a change in the practices – 
through a process of drift or conversion – occurs during the crisis and 
then, post-crisis, drawing on lessons learned from the crisis, a formal 
change of rule occurs - through a layering or a displacement.
We confront those research expectations through the process tracing 
of institutional change in the EU’s governance of health threat man-
agement. Process tracing is understood here as the systematic exam-
ination of diagnostic evidence selected as part of a temporal sequence 
of events or phenomena (Collier 2011: 823), and analysed in order to 
gain insights into causal mechanisms (Mahoney 2010: 125–31). To 
investigate how organisations innovate in response to crisis in a highly 
constrained environment, temporality must be considered (Goetz and 
Meyer-Sahling 2009). With the aim of investigating the extent to which 
and how crises impact the trajectory of institutionalisation in a highly 
constrained domain, we adopt a historical perspective (Haydu 1998) 
on the evolution of the ECDC’s mandate and practices, and focus on 
the institutional process that runs from the creation of the ECDC to 
the COVID-19 crisis.
Our analysis draws on 26 documents (Table 1) including documents 
from the Commission (8), the Council of the EU and/or Member States 
(6), the ECDC and its governing bodies (9) and 25 additional documents 
for the purpose of triangulation including minutes from the Health 
Security Committee (12), press articles (5), articles from the public health 
literature (4), articles from conference proceedings (1), independent 
reports on the ECDC (1) and public pleas for institutional change (2).
The institutionalisation of the EU’s health threat management 
over time
This section discusses the institutionalisation of the EU’s governance of 
health threat management from the SARS to the COVID-19 crisis. Our 
study shows that the two mechanisms of institutional change at play in 
the institutionalisation of the EU health crisis management are conversion 
and layering. In our analysis we find that layering intervenes after crises: 
a) the creation of the ECDC is the result of rule layering post the SARS 
crisis; b) the HSC is formalised through layering after the 2009 H1N1 
crisis; and c) the recent Commission’s proposal shows evidence of a likely 
layering post COVID-19. However, amid both the 2009 H1N1 crisis and 
the COVID-19 crisis, we observe fast paced changes in the form of a 
conversion process. In the case of the 2009 H1N1 crisis, conversion and 
layering were two distinct processes which respectively characterised 
change for the ECDC (conversion) and the HSC (layering).
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Initial rule layering: institutionalisation post SARS crisis
The creation of the ECDC in 2004 followed the SARS outbreak which 
was first identified by the WHO in February 2003. SARS appeared at a 
specific time in a sequence related to the emergence of European coop-
eration in human communicable disease prevention. While the 1992 
Maastricht treaty granted the EU coordinating competences in infectious 
diseases, national resistance towards EU intervention had remained high, 
until the crisis. The timing of SARS mattered: discussions about a 
European public health agency were ongoing before the SARS outbreak 
which acted as a catalyst and accelerated the process of layering that was 
unfolding at the time.
The first formal institutional change in public health at EU level is the 
creation in 1998 of a network for epidemiological surveillance (European 
Commission 1998). It consisted of an IT-based Early Warning and Response 
System (EWRS) for the control of communicable diseases (European 
Commission 1998). The EWRS established a centralised communication 
system to facilitate the exchange of information on emerging outbreaks 
between national organisations in charge of disease surveillance. The EU 
decision (European Union 1998) was the first institutional development. It 
institutionalised a network of national public health institutions, the ‘Charter 
Group’ financed by a grant of the Commission (Bartlett 1998). The raison 
d’être of the Charter Group was to flesh out the coordination of surveillance 
between national centres of disease control (Weinberg et al. 1999). The 
Charter Group built capacity for risk assessment through a networked 
informal approach that is common in risk regulation at EU level.
In 1998, formal institutionalisation in the shape of a new EU agency 
was still a step too far. The proposal triggered opposition among mem-
bers of the Charter Group. The Lancet featured an editorial titled ‘Not 
another European Institution’ (Lancet 1998). The clash revealed the reluc-
tance of national public health experts to give away control over coop-
eration. Wary of the reaction of Member States, the Commission thus 
sided with the Council of Ministers who also favoured the network 
approach (Council of the EU 1996, 1997, 1998; European Commission 1998).
Perception of the issue evolved in the early 2000s due to the accu-
mulation of health crises that were inherited from the 1990s (such as 
‘Mad Cow’ disease) as well as the increasingly important question of 
bioterrorism (European Commission 2003a, 2003b). At the end of 2001, 
amid concern regarding bioterrorism, we observe an informal institutional 
development with the creation of the Health Security Committee (HSC): 
the informal group convening health ministry representatives (Greer and 
Mätzke 2012). With this marked focus on health threats in the Council, 
the question of the creation of an agency able to identify threats became 
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more tangible. As early as June 2001, the possibility of a ‘European 
Centre’ was mentioned in the conclusions of the European Council 
(European Commission 2003b). In September 2002, Health Commissioner 
Byrne mentioned the ambition for an agency that ‘will bring together 
the expertise in Member States and will act as a reference and co-ordination 
point both in routine and in crisis situations’ (European Commission 2002).
A few months later, in February 2003, the SARS outbreak shook 
governments across the EU and the European Commission rapidly put 
forward the proposal for the creation of the ECDC on 2 August 2003. 
While its impact on the European continent remained limited, the SARS 
crisis shed a sobering light on the lack of preparedness of the Member 
States and convinced many that there was an urgent need for better 
coordination at the European level that would go beyond the existing 
networks at the time (European Commission 2003a).
On 21 April 2004, the founding regulation of the ECDC (European 
Union 2004) entered into force. The Directorate-General for Health and 
Consumers (DG SANCO, the pre-2014 DG SANTE) played a pivotal role 
in engineering the proposal. Regarding the surveillance network, DG 
SANCO showcased the need for improving cooperation while promoting 
the current activities of the network. For Member States, the Commission 
strategically included bioterrorist threat surveillance, as well as the explicit 
prohibition around advising Member States on risk management (Council 
of the EU 2004). As a result of this dynamic of dual support-seeking from 
the scientific community and from the Member States, the creation of the 
agency was an example of rule layering rather than displacement. The 
launch of the agency was superimposed on existing networks with the 
goal of improving and standardising collaboration between Member States. 
As per expectations, the SARS crisis shifted preferences among Member 
States but did not result in abrupt change. The founding regulation explic-
itly prohibited the newly created agency to advise Member States on risk 
management (Council of the EU 2004). The institutionalisation of surveil-
lance was the result of informal institutional developments which were 
then sanctioned by change in formal rules (layering). The timing of the 
SARS crisis mattered as much as the crisis itself: it accelerated rule layering. 
The Centre was not created by the crisis; it was the outcome of a longer 
process in which the SARS crisis played a catalytic role.
Conversion amid crisis and layering post crisis: the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic
This rule layering played a significant role in shaping the trajectory of 
the EU’s governance of health threats over time. It has clearly delineated 
the mandate of the ECDC and crucially has kept the Centre removed 
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from matters of risk management. Increasing surveillance capacity 
remained the primary mandate of the ECDC. The fine line between 
assessment and management was a contentious topic of discussion in 
the early stage of the Centre. Even the specific wording was subject to 
debate: the term ‘guidelines’ was considered too coercive and the term 
‘guidance’ was preferred (ECDC Advisory Forum 2005: 8). Attempts to 
discuss measures of risk management, such as vaccines, were also met 
with circumspection: ‘the European Commission reaffirmed that the 
policy agenda of the vaccination policy should stay in the hands of the 
Member States. If a policy agenda was to be discussed, it could be split 
between the Member States and the Commission. The Commission also 
called for a meeting to discuss the pertinence of setting up the committee 
on vaccines’ (ECDC Management Board 2007: 4). Member States remained 
sensitive to the infringing of their prerogatives: ‘One [Advisory Forum] 
member said they were surprised by the advice published by the ECDC 
on this issue, as their country did not need to be reminded of vaccina-
tion’ (ECDC Advisory Forum 2008: 10).
Yet, during the 2009 outbreak of H1N1 influenza we observe a conver-
sion of the rules layered at the creation of the ECDC, through changes in 
practices despite the ECDC’s limited remit. The H1N1 pandemic was the 
first salient health crisis that the EU faced after the SARS crisis. It was a 
test for the newly established Centre to demonstrate its added value 
(Liverani and Coker 2012). The crisis did not lead to a radical change but 
kicked off a conversion process which shifted the role of the ECDC regard-
ing vaccines. In the Summer of 2009, amid the pandemic, the Commission 
tasked the ECDC to define a vaccination strategy (Greco et al. 2011). This 
was the result of conversion, as vaccines are risk management tools, but 
it did not lead to a formal institutionalisation of these prerogatives.
However, we observe a new layering post H1N1: the 2013 decision of 
the Commission on health threats (European Union 2013) codifying the 
role of the HSC, henceforth able to decide quickly on the coordination 
of national responses without the endorsement of the Council. This was 
a gradual formal change rather than a major punctuated one. The deci-
sion was merely formalising the existence of the HSC which up to then 
had remained informal throughout the crisis (Greco et al. 2011). As per 
research expectations, the H1N1 crisis thus articulated two forms of 
institutional change highlighting the gradual nature of institutional inno-
vation: post crisis, a formal but gradual change for the HSC and during 
the crisis an informal change under the form of a conversion in the 
practices regarding vaccines for the ECDC. However, those two paths of 
institutionalisation remain independent from one another; conversion 
shifted the role of the ECDC punctually, while layering intervened post 
crisis to lay out in legal terms the role of the HSC. Amid the COVID-19 
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crisis, we find again those two forms of institutional development in 
action, but they are articulated more coherently around the institution-
alisation of the ECDC in the coordination of health threats.
Paths for the institutionalisation of the ECDC amid COVID-19
This section discusses the path for institutionalisation in the COVID-19 
sequence. Like the SARS and H1N1 crises, the COVID-19 crisis is 
unlikely to produce a radical and punctuated institutional change by 
itself. The analysis of the COVID-19 sequence points towards evidence 
of a significant conversion in practices since the beginning of the crisis. 
Before the crisis, the Centre was still on tip toes. As a former agency 
trainer emphasised (in Kirkpatrick et al. 2020): ‘We couldn’t say, “You 
should have this” (…) The advice and the assessment had to be phrased 
in an observation.’ However, since the beginning of the crisis, the 
Commission and Member States frequently have requested the ECDC’s 
advice on measures related to risk management, such as lockdowns and 
use of PPE, in spite of the ECDC’s limitations. Our analysis demonstrates 
that the articulation between conversion and layering amounts to the 
formalisation of a change in practice – which, however, can only be fully 
diagnosed once a decision has been made on the Commission’s proposal.
January 2020–February 2020: conversion and added value  
in crisis management
In early January 2020, Member States scrambled with coming to terms 
with the scope of the crisis and the ECDC struggled in assessing the 
COVID-19 threat; data was scarce (HSC 2020a). On 9 January 2020 DG 
SANTE launched a COVID-19 alert on the European EWRS. The HSC 
rapidly organised extraordinary meetings. As soon as the risk of 
person-to-person transmission was confirmed, the ECDC re-assessed the 
potential impact of COVID-19 as high (HSC 2020b).
The process of conversion was immediately apparent: the ECDC’s 
mandate was being gradually and informally expanded to the management 
of health threats. In the early weeks of 2020, the ECDC focussed on 
issuing advice for travellers, health professionals and the general public 
(ECDC 2020a), while DG SANTE provided guidelines for entry screening. 
When the issue of personal protective equipment (PPE) became salient 
at the end of January (HSC 2020b), the European Commission mandated 
the ECDC to prepare an assessment of PPE needs (HSC 2020c). Italy 
was the first Member State to experience a sharp increase in deaths 
linked to COVID-19 and was also first to impose restrictions on the 
free movement of persons. The Italian situation was discussed at length 
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during the 24 February meeting of the HSC on COVID-19 (HSC 2020d). 
The realisation that the crisis was more severe than previously expected 
led to a noticeable change, and coordination became the keyword in the 
HSC meetings: ‘Countries were also reminded to share information on 
planned measures with the HSC on COVID-19 before decisions are 
implemented to have a coordinated approach’ (HSC 2020d). Member 
States exhibited staggeringly different levels of preparedness regarding 
PPE and had uneven access to test kits (Bayer 2020; Guarascio 2020; 
Michalopoulos 2020). Member States activated the mechanism of joint 
procurement of medical equipment on 28 February 2020 for PPE and 
on 17 March 2020 for ventilators (European Commission 2020a).
The process of conversion in the role of the ECDC gradually unfolded 
as growing scientific evidence pointed to a higher lethality than expected. 
The ECDC developed advice on management measures in February 
(ECDC 2020c) and published guidelines for the use of NPI (ECDC 
2020b). The mere fact that these were officially called guidelines is evi-
dence that conversion was occurring at the level of practices.
March 2020–May 2020: acceleration of conversion  
and containment measures
The conversion of rules regarding the management of health threats in 
the EU accelerated as Member States took stock of the seriousness of 
the situation. On 2 March the ECDC presented an updated risk assess-
ment to the HSC (ECDC 2020d). This update included five detailed 
response scenarios for Member States to select, adapted to the variety 
of national contexts. The two most far-reaching scenarios both included 
general lockdowns. The explicitness of these guidelines is evidence of 
the conversion of practices: the ECDC’s input in all aspects of manage-
ment had become increasingly valued, as pointed out by representatives 
of the Member States (HSC 2020e). In a video conference of the European 
Council on 10 March 2020, Member States committed to further coor-
dinate management measures. Containment was part of the advice that 
the ECDC suggested as soon as clusters of human-to-human transmission 
appeared - a phenomenon that most Member States were already expe-
riencing at the time (ECDC 2020d). This led to a domino-like coordi-
nated entry into lockdowns: Slovakia and the Czech Republic enforced 
border controls from 12 March; the day after, Denmark, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Cyprus followed their lead, while Germany, Spain and 
France initiated these restrictions from 16 March 2020 (HSC 2020f).
As most of Europe was enforcing lockdowns, members of the ECDC’s 
management board, the governing body composed of national represen-
tatives that holds the Centre accountable, emphasised that ‘ECDC 
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guidance has become standard reference or the basis for discussion on 
national guidelines and recommendations’ (ECDC Management Board 
2020). This ECDC input was crucial and made an impression on national 
counterparts, explaining why the conversion process accelerated when 
uncertainty was at its peak.
As early as the end of March, the ECDC became proactive on the 
‘exit strategy’ front (ECDC 2020e) and was mandated by the HSC to 
produce the methodology for measures related to de-escalating (HSC 
2020g). The ECDC’s guidance for discharge and ending isolation (ECDC 
2020f) formed the basis for the 15 April European Commission’s com-
munication on the European roadmap to lifting coronavirus containment 
measures (European Commission 2020c). Except for Italy - which had 
initiated its lockdown before any other country and lifted some contain-
ment measures on 4 May 2020 – France, Belgium, the Netherlands 
Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, 
Ireland and Romania eased containment measures on 11 May 2020 (HSC 
2020j). This was a sign of sustained conversion; via the European 
Commission, the ECDC addressed strong and explicit messages on con-
tainment measures to Member States.
March 2020–June 2020: sustained conversion process  
and management measures
From March on, the process of conversion was also sustained in areas 
of risk management other than containment measures. The ECDC con-
tributed to advising Member States on PPE procurement, testing resources 
and vaccines. Once lockdowns started to enter into force across Europe, 
the Commission further requested that the ECDC advise on management 
measures, including: a) guidance on the rational use of PPE under scarcity 
conditions; b) overview reporting on readiness of national crisis emer-
gency systems; and c) guidance on health systems contingency planning 
to address possible containment scenarios (HSC 2020f).
Early in April, the Commission asked the ECDC to work on more 
detailed guidance regarding masks for the public and Member States 
agreed to develop a ‘common position based on ECDC guidance on face 
masks for the public’ (HSC 2020h). The Centre was tasked by the 
European Commission (HSC 2020k) to monitor the implementation of 
EU recommendations and guidelines on testing, evidencing a change in 
practices and thus a conversion in the management of health threats.
Regarding vaccines, on 7 May 2020 health ministers met via video 
conference during which ‘many countries noted strong support for man-
dating the HSC on COVID-19 to prepare a COVID-19 vaccination plan 
for the EU and EEA, as well as expressed an interest in possible joint 
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procurement of COVID-19 vaccines’ (HSC 2020j). On 28 May 2020, the 
ECDC gathered together considerations in prioritising access to COVID-19 
vaccines, including targeting priority to the HSC (HSC 2020k). On 12 June 
2020, the Commission presented a draft blueprint for a COVID-19 vacci-
nation plan: ‘The ECDC paper on considerations in prioritising access to 
COVID-19 vaccines served as an input to the blueprint’ (HSC 2020m). It 
was published on 17 June 2020 (European Commission 2020f), once again 
demonstrating the continued conversion process that has defined an increased 
role for the ECDC in the management of health threats since H1N1.
During the pandemic, the ECDC’s input became increasingly important 
to guide Member States’ national strategies. The ECDC’s advice not only 
informed Member States on surveillance or PPE, but also on containment 
measures such as lockdowns and de-escalation. Amid the crisis, the 
conversion of rules regarding the management of health threats in the 
EU led to change beyond public health, as management measures overlap 
with home affairs. From May 2020 onward, the ECDC has been directly 
involved in Home Affairs meetings between the Commission and Member 
States (HSC 2020k). This influence over the European Commission’s 
advice on management gradually increased, specifically on the question 
of opening and closing borders. On 13 May 2020, the European 
Commission presented a series of recommendations on re-establishing 
freedom of movement in the EU (European Commission 2020d) based 
on the ECDC’s advice. On borders, the ECDC has maintained a coherent 
position against border closure throughout the crisis: ‘It is important 
that decision makers understand that SARS-CoV-2, as a human to-human 
transmitted respiratory virus with global distribution, cannot be controlled 
by means of border closures’ (ECDC 2020g). This position is recognised 
in the HSC on COVID-19: ‘Available evidence therefore does not support 
border closures in the current situation where most countries world-wide 
are experiencing community transmission’ (HSC 2020l). The input of the 
ECDC was one more time important in the Commission’s Communication 
on temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU published 
on 11 June 2020 (European Commission 2020e). Freedom of movement 
between European countries was re-established on 15 June.
July 2020–November 2020: from conversion to layering proposal
While conversion in practice was incremental before COVID-19, conversion 
happened during the crisis at a much faster pace. There were already 
signs that institutional change might not be bound to this process of 
conversion. On 18 May, France and Germany jointly proposed setting up 
an EU ‘Health Task Force’ within the ECDC (Ministère de l’Europe et 
des Affaires étrangères 2020). It was followed by a plea from Denmark, 
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France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Poland on 10 June to widen the 
ECDC’s mandate, ‘to coordinate, with national health authorities, preven-
tion and reaction plans against future epidemics within a future EU health 
task force’ (Momtaz et al. 2020). Eventually on 16 July, this position gained 
consensus among Member States (Bundesgesundheitsministerium 2020).
On 28 May 2020, the European Commission presented its proposal for 
the next Health programme (European Commission 2020b): it mentioned 
flying doctors and a potentially stronger role for the ECDC in coordinating 
management. On 11 November 2020, the Commission announced a new 
legislative proposal in order to extend the ECDC’s mandate (European 
Commission 2020g). The proposal includes granting the ECDC the capacity 
to recommend measures for controlling outbreaks, thus advising on risk 
management. While in practice this was done during the crisis, this mea-
sure would formally redefine the role of the ECDC. This is evidence of 
the process of layering at play, capping off a process of conversion that 
unfolded throughout the crisis. This layering proposal goes further: the 
ECDC would be able to mobilise and deploy a (future) EU Health Task 
Force to assist local response in Member States, thus gaining an operational 
capability. As per expectations, gradual institutional change in response to 
a crisis has first taken place at the level of the practices during the crisis 
through a process of conversion. As there is evidence that vaccination will 
provide an exit to the crisis, the Commission’s proposal leads us to expect 
that post-crisis, formal institutional change will take the form of a layering 
that sanctions a change in practices.
The role of the COVID-19 crisis in the institutionalisation  
of the EU’s health threat management
The COVID-19 crisis has already furthered the institutionalisation of the 
governance system for health threats management in the EU. Almost as 
soon as the crisis kicked-off, the governance system for the management 
of health threats in the EU, with a muted role for the ECDC, was deemed 
ill-adapted to react promptly to the changing pandemic situation. Our 
analysis of the expansion of the mandate of the ECDC shows that a 
fast-paced conversion process has been unfolding since the early stage of 
the COVID-19 crisis, which is likely to be sanctioned by a change in 
formal rules through layering. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, 
the ECDC’s scientific input is no longer ‘closeted’. The Centre is now able 
to make recommendations on how to coordinate Member States’ manage-
ment of health threats. The ECDC is now de facto involved in the coor-
dination of risk management and will likely soon be involved de jure. The 
process of institutionalisation amid COVID-19 shows first and foremost 
that a paradigmatic change has occurred: such a contribution from the 
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ECDC would have been considered inappropriate by Member States before 
COVID-19. In this domain of high-level formal constraints, the role of 
crises thus remains decisive in inciting collective action among EU Member 
States (Boin et al. 2013; Greer 2012; Lamping and Steffen 2009).
However, and as per prior expectations (Boin et al. 2014; De Raeve 
2020), crises do not result in radical and abrupt institutional rehauls in 
the EU’s health threats management. The change in the mandate of the 
ECDC, while important to understand the institutionalisation of health 
threat management, remains, in effect, limited. There is no change in 
the Treaties and the management of health threats remains a simple 
coordinating competence at EU level. Whether one looks at conversion 
or layering amid the COVID-19 crisis, both processes lead to legal pro-
visions – dating back from the Maastricht Treaty – being fully imple-
mented. The institutionalisation of health threats management in the EU 
through crises is thus inherently gradual.
We find that a fundamental explanation for why crises only trigger 
gradual change in health threats management in the EU is the path taken 
by institutional change; crises act as catalysts in articulating gradual 
institutional changes within the narrow confines of the Treaties. Our 
case study of the institutionalisation of health threat management in the 
EU, from SARS to COVID-19, demonstrates that to grasp the role of 
crises in the institutionalisation of the EU’s public health policy, we 
should not search for a single pattern of mechanisms of institutionali-
sation. Health crises in the EU are both accelerators for informal change 
(conversion) and catalysts that may lead to formal change (layering). We 
found that the SARS crisis shed light on the catalytic capacity of crisis 
for gradual institutional change. The creation of the ECDC was not a 
major punctuation that abruptly transformed the public health policy in 
the EU. Instead, the ECDC was created through rule layering, which 
added the ECDC on top of an existing set of practices. The H1N1 crisis 
articulated two forms of institutional change: a formal but gradual lay-
ering for the HSC post crisis and, during the crisis, an informal change 
in the form of a conversion in the practices regarding the coordination 
of management (vaccines) for the ECDC.
The COVID-19 crisis however stands out vis-à-vis other transboundary 
health crises for two reasons:
1. Conversion is not necessarily temporary. During the H1N1 crisis, 
the ECDC was involved in coordination activities regarding vac-
cines. This change in practice was however reversible, as it was 
triggered by a temporary situation such as a pandemic (Busuioc 
2012). Our findings show that this expansion of the ECDC’s man-
date can survive the crisis, if change in practices is sanctioned by 
a change in the rules.
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2. The layering of new rules post SARS crisis formally sanctioned 
practices that pre-dated the crisis. Our analysis of the COVID-19 
crisis demonstrates that proposals for formal change post crisis 
sanctions gradual change that occurred amid the crisis. The formal 
change of institutional rules proposed by the Commission on 11 
November 2020 is thus not merely characterised by the addition 
of new rules to the existing ones but formalises changes in prac-
tices that occurred amid the crisis.
As with any case of institutional change, at the level of practices 
or formal rules, the balance of power is now altered, and likely with 
lasting effect. The ECDC has proven to be the rising star of the gov-
ernance system for health threats management in the EU. The ECDC 
is now directly involved in discussion and actions related to the man-
agement of the crisis. The Centre plays a central role in the meetings 
of HSC related to containment measures and vaccines. It also has a 
seat at the table in COVID-19 related meetings on home affairs regard-
ing borders. Nevertheless, at the time of its creation, the Centre had 
to make up its own role in this system of governance with an important 
handicap; the ECDC was formally barred from advising Member States 
on how to coordinate measures to manage public health risks. After 
the feelers of the 2009 H1N1 crisis, the institutional changes that have 
unfolded since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis are putting an 
end to the rather complicated task of the ECDC, which was to identify 
risks but without producing guidelines on how they ought to be managed 
(Table 2).
The institutional development of the ECDC is thus particularly sig-
nificant for the governance of health threat management: it reinforces 
capacity of EU level. But if the ECDC is a winner in this process, is 
there a loser? Extant literature has analysed the institutional consequences 
of a crisis as the empowerment of one institution at the expense of 
others. The scholarship on de Novo bodies, for instance, claims that 
European agencies are winners of this power game and that the 
Commission is gradually losing power (Bickerton et al. 2015; Hodson 
2015). This claim is however disputed; for example, Becker et al. (2016) 
find that the Commission is gaining new management types of compe-
tences. Our findings present a more nuanced story: the rise of the ECDC 
amid the COVID-19 crisis has been beneficial to the Commission. The 
Commission is not losing its voice to the advantage of the ECDC, but 
rather the two institutions are stronger together in inciting coordination 
in the HSC. Member States, on the other hand, are not losers either; 
while they may relinquish their sovereignty by accepting to play the 
game of coordination, they may at any time decide to go their own way. 
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The EU only has the competence to coordinate management, not to 
regulate, and Member States are thus free to implement management 
measures they see fit. Overall, the governance system of health threat 
management in the EU has become a fully realised system of coordination 
in which all institutions are playing a more cooperative game than during 
previous crises. It remains to be seen if the new status quo will stand 
the test of the next public health crisis, or if further institutionalisation 
beyond the logic of coordination is deemed necessary by Member States.
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